At 21:44 it swept Binance 14 again for 200M USDT and 13 other tokens deposited since the first sweep.
Blockaid said that at 21:44 UTC the operator swept Binance 14 again for 200M USDT and 13 other tokens deposited since the first sweep.
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Blockaid, which sells a product called Cosigner that rejects malicious transactions before signing, wrote its analysis of the Binance incident.
Blockaid Cosigner is an independent signing layer that sits on a wallet and utilizes signals from our exploit detection engine to reject malicious transactions.
Blockaid said its transaction security engine classified the delegation transaction as malicious because an EOA was being upgraded through EIP-7702 to an untrusted address.
Blockaid's transaction security engine classified the type-4 transaction that delegated Binance 14 as malicious on sight, with the reason that an EOA was being upgraded through EIP-7702 to an untrusted address.
Blockaid said its detection flagged the drain under two minutes after the sweep and before any public report.
Blockaid’s detection flagged the drain under two minutes after the sweep and before any public report
Blockaid said the EIP-7702 delegation was visible on-chain for three minutes and 24 seconds before the sweep.
The delegation itself was visible onchain for three minutes and 24 seconds before the sweep
Blockaid said the operator address 0x7C8601d4645b93cea45F71e118A729332e6B5CA0 was funded through three Tornado Cash withdrawals starting October 28.
The operator address, 0x7C8601d4645b93cea45F71e118A729332e6B5CA0 , was funded through three Tornado Cash withdrawals starting October 28.