The page states that Tether froze 971.1M USDT at 21:01 UTC, 37 minutes after the Ethereum transaction.
21:01 | Tether freezes 971.1M USDT, 37 minutes after the Ethereum transaction.
Hacken. Captured . Original
Independent record. Not associated with, endorsed by or operated by Binance. This site is read-only: there is nothing to sign in to, pay for or connect.
An independent record of the October 2026 Binance hack
A reconstruction of the attack in stages, built only from approved claims and approved timeline rows. Each line is one party's statement with its quote and source. Where parties disagree about time or mechanism, both are shown and nothing is reconciled.
How to read this page. The stage headings are fixed. Which stage a claim appears under is chosen by keywords in the claim's one-line summary, so a claim can sit under a stage a reader would not have chosen. It is a reading aid, not a finding. A claim appears under one stage only.
All times are UTC unless a source gave another zone, which is converted only where the source states the zone. A time taken from a live blog is when the entry was posted. A date with no time of day is shown as a day and is not placed on the minute index. Times from different sources are not averaged.
178 approved claims placed under a stage, 73 items on the minute index, 9 flagged conflicts, 10 open questions.
Per TRM Labs, TRM Labs. Claim 139
Binance said its hot wallets were compromised at around 20:05 UTC, a loss of about $6.3B
Per Binance, Binance. Claim 167
The page states that at 20:20 UTC, a Bitcoin hot wallet sent out 18,270 BTC.
Per Hacken. Claim 17
TRM said a Binance Bitcoin hot wallet sent 18,270 BTC to an attacker address
Per TRM Labs, TRM Labs. Claim 140
Per TRM Labs, TRM Labs. Claim 141
Chainalysis said funds began leaving Binance hot wallets (stated as around 4:20 p.m. ET)
Per Chainalysis, Chainalysis. Claim 189
Chainalysis said funds began leaving Binance hot wallets at around 4:20 p.m. ET on 29 October.
Per Chainalysis, Chainalysis. Claim 300
Per blockaid.io. Claim 106
Hacken said one Ethereum transaction moved about $2.53B out of a single Binance wallet
Per Hacken. Claim 18
Per blockaid.io. Claim 104
Per Halborn. Claim 760
Blockaid said 780M USDC was moved from a Circle smart account linked to Binance
Per blockaid.io. Claim 108
Per Dickson Wu, Cointelegraph. Claim 388
Per Tether, Hacken. Claim 19
TRM said Tether froze 971.1M USDT in the main receiving wallet, 37 minutes after the main sweep
Per TRM Labs, TRM Labs. Claim 143
The page states that Circle froze 823M USDC at 21:04 UTC.
Per Circle, Hacken. Claim 20
TRM said Circle froze 823M USDC in the main receiving wallet
Per TRM Labs, TRM Labs. Claim 144
Hacken noted another count dates the first freezes at 21:14, against 21:01 in its own table
Per Hacken. Claim 153
Per Chainalysis, Chainalysis. Claim 191
Chainalysis said stablecoin issuers began freezing funds by 5:14 p.m. ET (21:14 UTC) on 29 October.
Per Chainalysis, Chainalysis. Claim 299
Per Changpeng Zhao, Cointelegraph. Claim 349
Per Paolo Ardoino, Cointelegraph. Claim 350
Per blockaid.io. Claim 109
TRM said Ripple froze the wallet holding the stolen RLUSD, with 40.5M of 88.5M RLUSD still inside
Per TRM Labs, TRM Labs. Claim 145
Hacken's timeline table lists Ripple freezing 40.5M RLUSD at 22:01 UTC, citing TRM.
Per Hacken. Claim 154
TRM said World Liberty Financial froze 27.8M USD1 in the main receiving wallet
Per TRM Labs, TRM Labs. Claim 146
Hacken's timeline table lists World Liberty Financial freezing 27.8M USD1 at 22:10 UTC, citing TRM.
Per Hacken. Claim 155
Per Cointelegraph. Claim 118
TRM said a second wave of transfers reached Binance wallets on Avalanche and Polygon
Per TRM Labs, TRM Labs. Claim 149
Per Hacken. Claim 156
The page states that Binance stated the verified frozen total was $2.54B at 23:35 UTC.
Per Binance, Hacken. Claim 21
Per TRM Labs, TRM Labs. Claim 147
Per Binance, Cointelegraph. Claim 344
Per Jack McDonald, Cointelegraph. Claim 121
Per Arbitrum Security Council, Hacken. Claim 22
TRM said the Arbitrum Security Council moved 8,426 ETH and 74.6M ARB out of the attacker's reach
Per TRM Labs, TRM Labs. Claim 148
Hacken said Binance signed a new authorization resetting the delegation on its Ethereum wallet
Per Hacken. Claim 110
Per Halborn. Claim 763
Per Ido Ben-Natan, Cointelegraph. Claim 475
Per Binance, Cointelegraph. Claim 124
Per Arbitrum Security Council, Cointelegraph. Claim 125
Per Binance, Hacken. Claim 24
Per Binance, Binance. Claim 281
Per Elliptic, Cointelegraph. Claim 395
Hacken said the verified frozen total reached $2.84B, 44% of the theft
Per Hacken. Claim 23
Per Chainalysis, Cointelegraph. Claim 130
Per Ido Ben-Natan, Cointelegraph. Claim 352
Per Ido Ben-Natan, Cointelegraph. Claim 353
Per Cointelegraph. Claim 354
Per Ivo Georgiev, Cointelegraph. Claim 355
Per Ido Ben-Natan, Cointelegraph. Claim 356
Per Elliptic, Elliptic. Claim 100
Per Richard Teng, Cointelegraph. Claim 134
Per Richard Teng, Cointelegraph. Claim 340
Per Binance, Binance. Claim 284
Per Binance, Binance. Claim 285
Per Binance, Binance. Claim 469
Per Elliptic, Elliptic. Claim 199
What sources say about how the attacker first reached the systems involved, and any preparation they describe before the first transfer.
“Early on October 29, the operator deployed a first piece of code for the attack and tested it on two wallets,” TRM says. “Later that day, it rehearsed the final version on a third wallet, then routed the test funds back to itself. Four hours after that rehearsal, the same code was installed on a Binance hot wallet.”
Reviewer note: TRM account relayed by WIRED. Event time 00:00 UTC on 29 Oct is a date-only placeholder (source says early on October 29, no clock time).
TRM Labs, WIRED. Original Statement 379 Captured .
At 13:51 they ran a rehearsal that is worth a second look: a test wallet delegated with three authorizations at nonces 0, 1 and 2, of which exactly one applied.
Halborn. Original Statement 772 Captured .
The final contract went live at 15:59, a second rehearsal exercised the sweep path three times between 16:25 and 16:47, and the test funds were routed back.
Halborn. Original Statement 773 Captured .
Unconfirmed, but possibly massive binance hack. Entire Binance wallet drained into new EOA. Contract call was funded by Tornado Cash
Spreek, X. Original Statement 780 Captured .
Binance's other co-CEO, Richard Teng, said in a post on X that the breach was a "complex attack" that was not carried out by one person and included a compromised laptop as well as malicious software designed to delete evidence of its activity as it went along, "making it more difficult for us to trace and investigate."
Reviewer note: Event time is a date only. The 00:00 UTC time shown is a placeholder, the source gives no time of day.
Richard Teng, Yahoo Finance. Original Statement 212 Captured .
Binance's update of 02:23 UTC, Oct 30 , says its initial investigation "suggests that the security incident may involve a compromised DevOps engineer's laptop, which allowed an attacker to gain access to a service container and submit unauthorized withdrawal transactions," and that it has "found no evidence of any wallet private key leak."
Binance, Hacken. Original Statement 24 Captured .
Binance's initial investigation suggests that the security incident may involve a compromised DevOps engineer’s laptop, which allowed an attacker to gain access to a service container and submit unauthorized withdrawal transactions.
Binance, Binance. Original Statement 280 Captured .
Teng also disclosed that the attacker used a “self-destruct mechanism” to destroy tools and traces during the breach, complicating the investigation.
Richard Teng, Cointelegraph. Original Statement 340 Captured .
The operator address, 0x7C8601d4645b93cea45F71e118A729332e6B5CA0 , was funded through three Tornado Cash withdrawals starting October 28.
blockaid.io. Original Statement 105 Captured .
Concerns were first raised by blockchain researcher Spreek, who posted on X that assets from a Binance-linked Ethereum wallet had been transferred to a newly created address through a contract call allegedly funded by Tornado Cash.
Spreek, Cointelegraph. Original Statement 112 Captured .
Preparation began at least 36 hours before the theft. The attacker's operator wallet received three small withdrawals from Tornado Cash, a service that obscures where crypto comes from, starting the morning of October 28.
TRM Labs, TRM Labs. Original Statement 301 Captured .
Early indicators on the Ethereum activity suggested the attacker had phished the authorizations. That explanation covers Ethereum and leaves the other chains unexplained.
TRM Labs, TRM Labs. Original Statement 303 Captured .
Early signs on Ethereum pointed to phishing of the authorizations, which could explain Ethereum but none of the other chains.
Hacken. Original Statement 325 Captured .
“Binance says the attack began with a compromised engineer’s laptop. Targeting crypto company staff is a TraderTraitor hallmark,” Elliptic’s Robinson says.
Reviewer note: Robinson (Elliptic) relaying Binance first-update laptop hypothesis and his own TraderTraitor comparison; quote says targeting staff is the hallmark.
Tom Robinson, WIRED. Original Statement 382 Captured .
The sweeper contract was only around 130 lines, Immunefi Vice President Simone Imbrescia said in a statement shared with The Block. "The hard part sometimes is getting access to a system powerful enough to make very simple code devastating," Imbrescia said.
Reviewer note: Immunefi VP Simone Imbrescia, statement shared with The Block.
Simone Imbrescia, The Block. Original Statement 529 Captured .
Selig characterized the attack as a laptop-introduced vulnerability rather than a blockchain flaw—but Binance has since found “additional points of breach.”
Reviewer note: CFTC Chairman Michael Selig characterisation, with the article own caveat that Binance later reported additional breach points.
Decrypt. Original Statement 594 Captured .
Nothing public establishes the infection method, the dwell time, the operating system or the malware.
Halborn. Original Statement 754 Captured .
The operator wallet was funded from Tornado Cash starting the morning of October 28, in three withdrawals of about 0.098 ETH from the 0.1 ETH pool.
Halborn. Original Statement 771 Captured .
What sources say happened between that first foothold and the ability to move funds: which internal systems were reached and whether keys were involved.
The attacker first drained Binance 14 starting 20:24 UTC in a single transaction worth about $2.5B, minutes after Binance’s own signing infrastructure, under the attacker’s control, signed an EIP-7702 authorization delegating it to an attacker-deployed sweeper.
blockaid.io. Original Statement 104 Captured .
co-CEO Richard Teng said the attacker "did not simply use one engineer's permissions, and this was not a single 'one-click' action."
Reviewer note: Event time is a date only. The 00:00 UTC time shown is a placeholder, the source gives no time of day.
Richard Teng, Hacken. Original Statement 25 Captured .
The hackers were able to manipulate a system used to approve transactions to move money out of a Binance-controlled, internet-connected so-called "hot" wallet in a way that did not pass through normal approval controls, Teng said.
Reviewer note: Event time is a date only. The 00:00 UTC time shown is a placeholder, the source gives no time of day.
Richard Teng, Yahoo Finance. Original Statement 213 Captured .
a compromise of signing infrastructure. We don’t think a key was leaked,” he said.
Ido Ben-Natan, Cointelegraph. Original Statement 475 Captured .
We have found no evidence of any wallet private key leak.
Binance, Binance. Original Statement 281 Captured .
Binance’s investigation into its $6.3 billion hack has uncovered “additional points of breach,” the exchange said , after initially pointing to a potentially compromised laptop. The exchange said it was still gathering facts in coordination with law enforcement. Binance said it remained on track to resume withdrawals in 45 hours, while deposits remained unaffected.
Reviewer note: Event time is the time Cointelegraph stamped its live-blog entry (8:37 am UTC), not a time stated by the speaker.
Binance, Cointelegraph. Original Statement 129 Captured .
“The takeaway is that ultimately the signer signed a transaction that they shouldn’t have,” he said.
Ido Ben-Natan, Cointelegraph. Original Statement 356 Captured .
The attacker used an EIP-7702 delegation to gain execution authority over a hot wallet, Teng said. That delegation “did not pass through our normal approval controls.”
Reviewer note: Event time is the time Cointelegraph stamped its live-blog entry (2:34 pm UTC), not a time stated by the speaker.
Richard Teng, Cointelegraph. Original Statement 134 Captured .
Our initial investigation suggested that the incident may involve a compromised laptop, however, our subsequent investigation has uncovered additional points of breach.
Binance, Binance. Original Statement 284 Captured .
At this stage, we have found no evidence that wallet private keys were leaked.
Binance, Binance. Original Statement 285 Captured .
Binance's initial investigation suggested an engineer's laptop was compromised, which allowed access to unauthorised withdrawals, but a later update said they had uncovered "additional points of breach".
Binance, BBC News. Original Statement 8 Captured .
Richard Teng, Binance's co-chief executive officer, said the hack was carried out by more than one person, and the hackers used sophisticated methods to hide their tracks, such as a "self-destruct mechanism".
Richard Teng, BBC News. Original Statement 9 Captured .
The company said on X that an initial investigation suggested the incident may have involved a compromised laptop, but that a subsequent investigation uncovered additional "points of breach."
Binance, npr.org. Original Statement 44 Captured .
Binance initially linked the breach to a compromised DevOps engineer's laptop, but now says it has uncovered additional points of breach in a complex attack that "was not carried out by one person".
Binance, Elliptic. Original Statement 56 Captured .
In TRM's assessment, the most likely explanation is that the attacker gained the ability to make Binance's hot wallet signing system sign transactions of its choosing across chains.
TRM Labs, TRM Labs. Original Statement 150 Captured .
Binance's initial investigation suggests that the security incident may involve a compromised DevOps engineer’s laptop, which allowed an attacker to gain access to a service container and submit unauthorized withdrawal transactions. We have found no evidence of any wallet private key leak.
Binance, Binance. Original Statement 161 Captured .
Our initial investigation suggested that the incident may involve a compromised laptop, however, our subsequent investigation has uncovered additional points of breach. At this stage, we have found no evidence that wallet private keys were leaked.
Binance, Binance. Original Statement 171 Captured .
Blockaid CEO Ido Ben-Natan said the attackers appeared to have compromised Binance’s transaction signing process. Binance said Friday that it had found no evidence of leaked wallet private keys, though its investigation remained ongoing.
Ido Ben-Natan, Cointelegraph. Original Statement 278 Captured .
Teng added that the attack "was not carried out by one person"
Reviewer note: Event time cleared 2026-11-01: the quote states no date or time for Teng's video update.
Elliptic, Elliptic. Original Statement 308 Captured .
Nobody outside Binance knows whether a policy layer was set, what it checked, or how an attacker managed to get signatures out of it.
Hacken. Original Statement 316 Captured .
Binance says it found no evidence that a private key leaked, while investigators say Binance's signing system signed for the attacker, and the two statements can both be true.
Hacken. Original Statement 323 Captured .
Cap value and rate per wallet at the signer and hold new destinations for a second approval
Hacken. Original Statement 324 Captured .
The most likely explanation is that the attacker gained the ability to make Binance's hot wallet signing system sign transactions of its choosing across chains.
Hacken. Original Statement 326 Captured .
The event, meanwhile, also raises questions about why stronger approval controls were not in place, said Kok Tin Gan, cofounder and CEO of cybersecurity firm NyxLab.
Kok Tin Gan, npr.org. Original Statement 331 Captured .
The BBC quoted Richard Teng as saying the attack was not carried out by one person.
This was not carried out by one person.
Richard Teng, BBC News. Original Statement 337 Captured .
Ben-Natan said attackers may have used a compromised developer’s computer to gain access to Binance’s wallet-signing infrastructure.
Reviewer note: Blockaid CEO Ido Ben-Natan speculation as reported by Cointelegraph; Binance itself said its first update pointed to a DevOps engineer laptop.
Ido Ben-Natan, Cointelegraph. Original Statement 464 Captured .
and the only link Binance has confirmed so far is the first one. Everything between the laptop and the signatures is still inference
Halborn. Original Statement 751 Captured .
Link two is the one nobody has explained: how access to a container became accepted financial instructions.
Halborn. Original Statement 752 Captured .
The candidate paths are misuse of that service identity, modification of withdrawal requests in flight, deployment of altered code under a stronger identity, manipulation of policy or approvals, or direct access to a signing interface.
Halborn. Original Statement 753 Captured .
Nine other chains lost money through nothing more exotic than correctly signed transfers, and that is the strongest evidence that the compromise sat in the signing path rather than in one wallet's key.
Halborn. Original Statement 755 Captured .
So either Binance’s signing path signs raw digests, or it supports 7702 authorizations as a message type and nothing in front of it objected to fifty of them. Both are inference.
Halborn. Original Statement 757 Captured .
Binance has confirmed the first two boxes, the chain shows the last four, and the dashed box in between is the one the post-mortem has to explain.
Halborn. Original Statement 758 Captured .
The question that decides the root cause is simple to state and impossible to answer from the outside: which identity caused which component to authorize which bytes, and why did that instruction pass?
Halborn. Original Statement 759 Captured .
The transactions by which funds are said to have left the exchange wallets, and how each is said to have been authorised.
Eleven Binance hot-wallet keys signed transfers to an address created minutes earlier, and one of them signed an EIP-7702 authorization that turned its wallet into standing infrastructure for the attacker.
Reviewer note: Event time is a date only. The 00:00 UTC time shown is a placeholder, the source gives no time of day.
blockaid.io. Original Statement 89 Captured .
On the evening of 29 October 2026, an attacker emptied Binance hot wallets on 10 blockchains
Reviewer note: Date only: the quote says "On the evening of 29 October 2026". No clock time is stated, so 00:00 UTC is a placeholder. Re-authored 2026-11-01 with a fuller exact quote; replaces claim 399, whose quote did not hold the date the statement gave.
Hacken. Original Statement 914 Captured .
Timeline row: Binance said its hot wallets were compromised at around 20:05 UTC, a loss of about $6.3B
At around 2026-10-29 20:05 (UTC), our hot wallets were compromised, resulting in a loss of approximately $6.3B USD worth of token assets.
Reviewer note: Binance states the time as 'around 2026-10-29 20:05 (UTC)'.
Binance, Binance. Original Statement 167 Captured .
At 20:20 UTC, the operator submitted a single transaction containing 50 authorizations. Each was signed by the Binance hot wallet, and each pointed it to a sweeper contract that accepts instructions only from the operator.
TRM Labs, TRM Labs. Original Statement 141 Captured .
Timeline row: Chainalysis said funds began leaving Binance hot wallets (stated as around 4:20 p.m. ET)
Around 4:20 p.m. ET on October 29, 2026, funds began leaving Binance hot wallets across multiple blockchains. Unauthorized transfers totaled approximately $6.4 billion, the largest theft in crypto history.
Reviewer note: Chainalysis states the time as 4:20 p.m. ET. Converted to UTC at UTC-4 (US daylight time was in effect on 29 October 2026).
Chainalysis, Chainalysis. Original Statement 189 Captured .
Chainalysis said funds began leaving Binance hot wallets at around 4:20 p.m. ET on 29 October.
Around 4:20 p.m. ET on October 29, 2026, funds began leaving Binance hot wallets across multiple blockchains.
Chainalysis, Chainalysis. Original Statement 300 Captured .
Timeline row: Blockaid said the operator sent a transaction carrying 50 EIP-7702 authorizations to a Binance Ethereum hot wallet
At 20:20:59 the operator sent a type-4 transaction to Binance 14, 0x28C6c06298d514Db089934071355E5743bf21d60 , carrying 50 EIP-7702 authorizations signed with the Binance 14 key, one per nonce from 18,914,775 to 18,914,824, each delegating the wallet to the sweeper.
blockaid.io. Original Statement 106 Captured .
Timeline row: Hacken said one Ethereum transaction moved about $2.53B out of a single Binance wallet
Ethereum sits in the middle of this sequence: at 20:24, one transaction moved about $2.53B out of a single wallet.
Hacken. Original Statement 18 Captured .
At 20:24:23, three minutes and 24 seconds later, the operator called sweep on Binance 14 (transaction ), sending 167,464 ETH, 1.615B USDT, and about 60 other tokens to a collection address with no prior history, 0x5227f603C1eE34CE3C06eFe6477003BDfCCB2f8c . Binance 14 was left with 1 ETH. At prices at the time, the basket was worth about $2.5B.
blockaid.io. Original Statement 107 Captured .
At 20:24:23 (3 minutes 24 seconds after the delegation), in block 26,300,770, the operator called Binance 14.
Halborn. Original Statement 760 Captured .
Timeline row: Blockaid said 780M USDC was moved from a Circle smart account linked to Binance
At 20:41:23 the operator used the still-delegated Binance 14, which owns the Circle smart account Binance Hot Wallet 34 , to move 780M USDC from that account to the collection address, followed by another 43M USDC.
blockaid.io. Original Statement 108 Captured .
Timeline row: Blockaid said the operator swept the still-delegated Binance wallet again for 200M USDT and 13 other tokens
At 21:44 it swept Binance 14 again for 200M USDT and 13 other tokens deposited since the first sweep.
blockaid.io. Original Statement 109 Captured .
Yesterday, hackers stole more than $6 billion from Binance in less than 4 hours, the biggest heist in history.
Reviewer note: Date only: the article says Lummis wrote this "in a Friday post on X"; Friday was 30 October 2026. No clock time is stated, so 00:00 UTC is a placeholder.
Cointelegraph. Original Statement 398 Captured .
Timeline row: Hacken said Binance signed a new authorization resetting the delegation on its Ethereum wallet
at 00:10:35 UTC on 30 October, Binance 14 signed a new authorization that reset its delegation, 3 hours 46 minutes after the sweep.
Hacken. Original Statement 110 Captured .
The delegation was cleared at 00:10:35 on October 30, three hours and fifty minutes after it was installed.
Halborn. Original Statement 763 Captured .
Attackers could have stolen the funds without EIP-7702, Ido Ben-Natan, Blockaid’s co-founder and CEO, told Cointelegraph on Friday.
Ido Ben-Natan, Cointelegraph. Original Statement 352 Captured .
“The 7702 upgrade is a way to do this in one sweep and maybe a way to bypass some sort of checks they may have,”
Ido Ben-Natan, Cointelegraph. Original Statement 353 Captured .
VEER later said the Binance attack appeared broader than a single malicious signature, but that EIP-7702 gave attackers “a handy sweep button on Ethereum.”
Cointelegraph. Original Statement 354 Captured .
Ivo Georgiev, co-founder and CEO of Ethereum wallet provider Ambire, said that EIP-7702 made little difference to the attack because the hackers already had the ability to authorize transactions.
Ivo Georgiev, Cointelegraph. Original Statement 355 Captured .
"An attacker moved approximately USD 6.36 billion out of Binance wallets on ten blockchains, most of it in about 20 minutes," TRM said.
TRM Labs, npr.org. Original Statement 46 Captured .
On October 29, 2026, an attacker moved approximately USD 6.36 billion out of Binance wallets on ten blockchains, most of it in about 20 minutes starting at 20:05 UTC.
TRM Labs, TRM Labs. Original Statement 136 Captured .
Three minutes and 24 seconds after the delegation, the operator instructed the Binance hot wallet to send its entire balance to an attacker-controlled address. That single transaction moved 167,464 ETH and 63 tokens, including 1.615 billion USDT.
TRM Labs, TRM Labs. Original Statement 142 Captured .
Chainalysis said unauthorized transfers totaled approximately $6.4 billion.
Unauthorized transfers totaled approximately $6.4 billion, the largest theft in crypto history.
Chainalysis, Chainalysis. Original Statement 298 Captured .
Elliptic said the attacker drained Binance hot wallets across 11 blockchains over a few hours.
Over the course of a few hours, the attacker drained Binance hot wallets across 11 blockchains.
Elliptic, Elliptic. Original Statement 309 Captured .
At Binance the delegation stayed for 3 hours 46 minutes after the sweep and later deposits were swept again
Hacken. Original Statement 317 Captured .
The delegation itself was visible onchain for three minutes and 24 seconds before the sweep
blockaid.io. Original Statement 327 Captured .
Blockaid's transaction security engine classified the type-4 transaction that delegated Binance 14 as malicious on sight, with the reason that an EOA was being upgraded through EIP-7702 to an untrusted address.
blockaid.io. Original Statement 329 Captured .
The majority of the stolen crypto was taken in a period of around 20 minutes on October 29, according to analysis by crypto tracing firm TRM Labs.
WIRED. Original Statement 332 Captured .
Binance wallets on the other nine chains sent funds to the attacker through ordinary signed transfers.
TRM Labs, TRM Labs. Original Statement 458 Captured .
He said attackers could have drained the funds through other methods, but warned that exchange engineers might overlook the need to revoke a malicious EIP-7702 delegation after regaining control of their systems.
Reviewer note: Ambire CEO Ivo Georgiev as reported by Cointelegraph.
Ivo Georgiev, Cointelegraph. Original Statement 466 Captured .
An attacker holding the raw key would sign one authorization at submission time. Fifty pre-signed ones suggest someone who could get the key to sign digests but could not control when, how fast, or how many times.
Halborn. Original Statement 756 Captured .
Binance 16, the second Ethereum hot wallet, signed nine ordinary transfers to the attacker worth about $174 million, with no delegation at all.
Halborn. Original Statement 761 Captured .
My reading is persistence and independence. One signature bought unlimited, policy-free control of the largest wallet until someone revoked it, with no further requests through a compromised path that could be cut at any moment.
Halborn. Original Statement 762 Captured .
Either those transfers were signed earlier and held back, or the attacker's access outlived the pause.
Halborn. Original Statement 769 Captured .
Statements about individual blockchains, grouped under each chain the statement names.
Blockchain security firm Blockaid said its team had identified roughly $3.3 billion in suspicious transfers involving Binance-linked wallets across Ethereum, Arbitrum and Avalanche.
Cointelegraph. Original Statement 117 Captured .
The page states that at 20:20 UTC, a Bitcoin hot wallet sent out 18,270 BTC.
At 20:20 a Bitcoin hot wallet sent out 18,270 BTC, and a Tron wallet sent more than 600 million USDT right after that.
Hacken. Original Statement 17 Captured .
Timeline row: TRM said a Binance Bitcoin hot wallet sent 18,270 BTC to an attacker address
At 20:20 UTC, a Binance Bitcoin hot wallet sent 18,270 BTC to an attacker address, which began splitting the funds into round 1,000 BTC and 100 BTC pieces inside the same block.
TRM Labs, TRM Labs. Original Statement 140 Captured .
The first transfers came at 20:05 UTC on the XRP Ledger, where five Binance wallets sent 233 million XRP to a single address.
Hacken. Original Statement 16 Captured .
Timeline row: TRM said five Binance wallets on the XRP Ledger sent 233.46M XRP to one address between 20:05 and 20:09
Between 20:05 and 20:09 UTC, five Binance wallets sent 233.46 million XRP to a single attacker address, leaving each wallet with only its minimum balance.
TRM Labs, TRM Labs. Original Statement 139 Captured .
Bitquery notes that the XRP and Solana drains share no address with the rest of the operation and are tied to it only by timing and transaction construction
Halborn. Original Statement 770 Captured .
Blockchain security firm Blockaid said its team had identified roughly $3.3 billion in suspicious transfers involving Binance-linked wallets across Ethereum, Arbitrum and Avalanche.
Cointelegraph. Original Statement 117 Captured .
TRM said a second wave around 23:05 UTC reached Binance wallets on Avalanche and Polygon.
Timeline row: TRM said a second wave of transfers reached Binance wallets on Avalanche and Polygon
A second wave around 23:05 UTC reached Binance wallets on Avalanche and Polygon.
TRM Labs, TRM Labs. Original Statement 149 Captured .
23:05 | Second wave: Binance wallets on Avalanche and Polygon send funds.
Hacken. Original Statement 156 Captured .
Blockchain security firm Blockaid said its team had identified roughly $3.3 billion in suspicious transfers involving Binance-linked wallets across Ethereum, Arbitrum and Avalanche.
Cointelegraph. Original Statement 117 Captured .
Most of the money left in about 20 minutes, and a smaller second wave hit Avalanche and Polygon around 23:05 UTC.
Hacken. Original Statement 315 Captured .
TRM said a second wave around 23:05 UTC reached Binance wallets on Avalanche and Polygon.
Timeline row: TRM said a second wave of transfers reached Binance wallets on Avalanche and Polygon
A second wave around 23:05 UTC reached Binance wallets on Avalanche and Polygon.
TRM Labs, TRM Labs. Original Statement 149 Captured .
23:05 | Second wave: Binance wallets on Avalanche and Polygon send funds.
Hacken. Original Statement 156 Captured .
Most of the money left in about 20 minutes, and a smaller second wave hit Avalanche and Polygon around 23:05 UTC.
Hacken. Original Statement 315 Captured .
| Chain | Claims under this stage | Addresses named by a source | Archived transfers | Freeze events |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ethereum | 1 | Attacker: 610; Intermediary: 1; Victim: 2 | 0 | 6 |
| Bitcoin | 2 | Attacker: 19 | 0 | 0 |
| XRP Ledger | 2 | none | 0 | 0 |
| Solana | 1 | Attacker: 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Arbitrum | 1 | none | 0 | 0 |
| Avalanche | 4 | none | 0 | 0 |
| Polygon | 3 | none | 0 | 0 |
Freezes, blacklists and emergency moves by issuers and network bodies, with the time each source gives.
Between $2.7B and $2.84B was frozen within hours , almost all of it stablecoins that issuers such as Tether and Circle can block.
Reviewer note: Event time is a date only. The 00:00 UTC time shown is a placeholder, the source gives no time of day. Hacken gives a range, shown here as its two end values. The source Hacken links for the range is Elliptic.
Hacken. Original Statement 13 Captured .
About $3B was frozen within hours, while most of the ETH and other native assets stayed with the attacker.
Reviewer note: Event time is a date only. The 00:00 UTC time shown is a placeholder, the source gives no time of day.
blockaid.io. Original Statement 90 Captured .
The stolen USDT reached the attacker's main Ethereum wallet at 20:24 UTC. Tether froze that wallet 37 minutes later, locking 1.18 billion USDT in place, and then followed the funds, freezing four more attacker addresses within 17 minutes. Circle froze the 823 million USDC in the same wallet three minutes after that.
Elliptic, Elliptic. Original Statement 92 Captured .
21:01 | Tether freezes 971.1M USDT, 37 minutes after the Ethereum transaction.
Reviewer note: The Speaker field names the party that acted. The timing and the amount are as stated by Hacken, not by Tether. Hacken adds that another count dates the first freezes at 21:14.
Tether, Hacken. Original Statement 19 Captured .
Timeline row: TRM said Tether froze 971.1M USDT in the main receiving wallet, 37 minutes after the main sweep
Tether froze 971.1 million USDT in the main receiving wallet at 21:01 UTC, 37 minutes after the main sweep. Later sweeps landed in the frozen wallet, which now holds 1.175 billion USDT.
TRM Labs, TRM Labs. Original Statement 143 Captured .
The page states that Circle froze 823M USDC at 21:04 UTC.
21:04 | Circle freezes 823M USDC.
Reviewer note: The Speaker field names the party that acted. The timing and the amount are as stated by Hacken, not by Circle.
Circle, Hacken. Original Statement 20 Captured .
Timeline row: TRM said Circle froze 823M USDC in the main receiving wallet
Circle froze the 823 million USDC in the main receiving wallet at 21:04 UTC, in coordination with law enforcement.
TRM Labs, TRM Labs. Original Statement 144 Captured .
Tether froze 975.1 million USDT in the main receiving address, and Circle, issuer of the rival stablecoin USDC, froze 823 million USDC in the same wallet at 21:04 UTC, bringing the total frozen to about $1.8 billion.
Reviewer note: Statement reworded to "Decrypt reported" and approved 2026-11-01. The Decrypt page was published 2026-10-29 21:36 UTC; the 21:04 UTC in the quote is the Circle freeze. Decrypt's 975.1 million USDT differs from Hacken's and TRM's 971.1 million.
Decrypt. Original Statement 694 Captured .
Timeline row: Hacken noted another count dates the first freezes at 21:14, against 21:01 in its own table
Another count dates the first freezes at 21:14.
Reviewer note: Hacken does not name the source of the alternative count.
Hacken. Original Statement 153 Captured .
Chainalysis said freezes started by 5:14 p.m. Eastern on October 29.
Timeline row: Chainalysis said freezes started by 5:14 p.m. Eastern; TRM and Hacken list Tether's first freeze at 21:01
But the industry caught up with them more quickly than they expected: by 5:14 pm eastern the freezes started.
Reviewer note: Chainalysis states 5:14 p.m. Eastern. Converted to UTC at UTC-4. Hacken and TRM list Tether's freeze at 21:01 UTC.
Chainalysis, Chainalysis. Original Statement 191 Captured .
Chainalysis said stablecoin issuers began freezing funds by 5:14 p.m. ET (21:14 UTC) on 29 October.
Stablecoin issuers began freezing funds by 5:14 p.m. ET on October 29
Chainalysis, Chainalysis. Original Statement 299 Captured .
the activity appeared to be a hack, adding that Tether and Circle had frozen approximately $971 million and $823 million, respectively.
Changpeng Zhao, Cointelegraph. Original Statement 349 Captured .
the company had frozen more than $1.567 billion in USDT linked to the potential exploit.
Paolo Ardoino, Cointelegraph. Original Statement 350 Captured .
Timeline row: TRM said Ripple froze the wallet holding the stolen RLUSD, with 40.5M of 88.5M RLUSD still inside
Ripple froze the wallet holding the stolen RLUSD at 22:01 UTC, with 40.5 million of the 88.5 million RLUSD still inside.
TRM Labs, TRM Labs. Original Statement 145 Captured .
Hacken's timeline table lists Ripple freezing 40.5M RLUSD at 22:01 UTC, citing TRM.
22:01 | Ripple freezes 40.5M RLUSD.
Hacken. Original Statement 154 Captured .
Halborn said Tether blacklisted Binance 14 itself at 22:06.
Timeline row: Halborn said Tether blacklisted Binance 14 itself at 22:06
Tether: blacklisted Binance 14 itself at 22:06.
Halborn. Original Statement 766 Captured .
Timeline row: TRM said World Liberty Financial froze 27.8M USD1 in the main receiving wallet
World Liberty Financial froze the 27.8 million USD1 in the main receiving wallet at 22:10 UTC, and froze USD1 in the compromised Binance hot wallet at 22:26 UTC.
TRM Labs, TRM Labs. Original Statement 146 Captured .
Hacken's timeline table lists World Liberty Financial freezing 27.8M USD1 at 22:10 UTC, citing TRM.
22:10 | World Liberty Financial freezes 27.8M USD1.
Hacken. Original Statement 155 Captured .
Decentralized lending protocol Aave froze markets across its V3 and V4 deployments as a precaution following the Binance hack.
Reviewer note: Event time is the time Cointelegraph stamped its live-blog entry (10:32 pm UTC), not a time stated by the speaker.
Cointelegraph. Original Statement 118 Captured .
the Binance exploiter deposited 60 million USDT and borrowed 19,762 Wrapped Ether (WETH), worth about $44.6 million at the time.
Cointelegraph. Original Statement 409 Captured .
World Liberty Financial has frozen $27 million in US-dollar-pegged stablecoin USD1 and $2 million worth of WLFI, according to Binance co-founder Yi He. “USD1 has taken proactive steps to freeze the $27 million in USD1 associated with the Binance hack,” said World Liberty Financial co-founder and CEO Zach Witkoff.
Reviewer note: Event time is the time Cointelegraph stamped its live-blog entry (10:36 pm UTC), not a time stated by the speaker.
Cointelegraph. Original Statement 119 Captured .
The page states that Binance stated the verified frozen total was $2.54B at 23:35 UTC.
23:35 | Binance states that the verified frozen total is $2.54B.
Reviewer note: Hacken relays a Binance statement and cites TRM for it.
Binance, Hacken. Original Statement 21 Captured .
Binance said the verified total of assets frozen in connection with the hack had reached $2.54 billion, clarifying differing figures circulating publicly, including references to $1.8 billion.
Reviewer note: Event time is the time Cointelegraph stamped its live-blog entry (11:35 pm UTC), not a time stated by the speaker.
Binance, Cointelegraph. Original Statement 120 Captured .
TRM said Binance stated at 23:35 UTC that the verified total frozen had reached USD 2.54 billion.
Timeline row: TRM said Binance stated the verified frozen total had reached $2.54B (Hacken and Cointelegraph give the same time)
Binance said at 23:35 UTC that the verified total frozen had reached USD 2.54 billion.
TRM Labs, TRM Labs. Original Statement 147 Captured .
the verified total of assets frozen in connection with the hack had reached $2.54 billion, clarifying differing figures circulating publicly, including references to $1.8 billion.
Binance, Cointelegraph. Original Statement 344 Captured .
Ripple is freezing holdings of its dollar-pegged RLUSD stablecoin linked to the Binance hack, according to Jack McDonald, the company’s senior vice president of stablecoins. McDonald said Ripple was “actively freezing affected funds” and coordinating with relevant parties to support the investigation. He did not disclose the amount frozen.
Reviewer note: Event time is the time Cointelegraph stamped its live-blog entry (11:40 pm UTC), not a time stated by the speaker.
Jack McDonald, Cointelegraph. Original Statement 121 Captured .
Binance said customer funds were safe and it is working with industry partners to freeze some of the affected assets, with about $3 billion located so far.
Reviewer note: Event time is a date only. The 00:00 UTC time shown is a placeholder, the source gives no time of day.
Binance, Yahoo Finance. Original Statement 208 Captured .
30 Oct, 00:08 | The Arbitrum Security Council moves 8,426 ETH and 74.6M ARB out of the attacker's reach.
Reviewer note: The Speaker field names the party that acted. The timing and the amount are as stated by Hacken, not by the Arbitrum Security Council.
Arbitrum Security Council, Hacken. Original Statement 22 Captured .
Timeline row: TRM said the Arbitrum Security Council moved 8,426 ETH and 74.6M ARB out of the attacker's reach
At 00:08 UTC, it used those powers to force two transfers out of the attacker's wallet on Arbitrum, moving 8,426 ETH and 74.6 million ARB, about USD 30 million, out of the attacker's reach.
TRM Labs, TRM Labs. Original Statement 148 Captured .
Binance said the current verified amount of assets frozen from the hack is now $3 billion.
Reviewer note: Event time is the time Cointelegraph stamped its live-blog entry (12:52 am UTC), not a time stated by the speaker.
Binance, Cointelegraph. Original Statement 124 Captured .
Timeline row: Cointelegraph reported the Arbitrum Security Council said it froze $30.5M; TRM and Hacken give 00:08 for the transfer (live-blog entry time)
The update came after the Arbitrum Security Council said it executed a transaction to freeze $30.5 million from the Binance exploit, involving 74.6 million Arbitrum (ARB) and 8,425 Ether (ETH). “The Security Council acted by weighing its commitment to the security and integrity of the Arbitrum community and Arbitrum governance without impacting any Arbitrum users or applications,” it said. “As of October 30, 2026 time, the funds have been successfully transferred to an intermediary frozen wallet,” it said.
Reviewer note: Event time is the time Cointelegraph stamped its live-blog entry (12:52 am UTC), not a time stated by the speaker. Hacken and TRM give 00:08 UTC for the Arbitrum action itself.
Arbitrum Security Council, Cointelegraph. Original Statement 125 Captured .
LlamaRisk, an Aave risk service provider, said in its 1:00 am update that the attacker’s position subsequently held around $59.9 million in USDT collateral against $43.8 million in debt. Aave said the position remained overcollateralized and did not put protocol suppliers at risk.
Reviewer note: LlamaRisk 1:00 am update; the source does not state a zone, so the 01:00 UTC event time is the extractor assumption. Differs from claim 409 (60M collateral, 44.6M WETH borrowed at the time).
LlamaRisk, Cointelegraph. Original Statement 393 Captured .
Timeline row: Cointelegraph reported Elliptic estimated $2.84B frozen by 07:00 UTC on Friday (Hacken gives the same figure at 08:00 UTC)
Elliptic estimated that $2.84 billion had been frozen by 7:00 am UTC on Friday, while the attackers still controlled around $3.33 billion in assets that issuers could not immobilize.
Reviewer note: Elliptic estimate relayed by Cointelegraph; side by side with Elliptic 2.85B (claim 57), Hacken 2.84B at 08:00 UTC (claim 23).
Elliptic, Cointelegraph. Original Statement 395 Captured .
Timeline row: Hacken said the verified frozen total reached $2.84B, 44% of the theft
08:00 | Verified frozen total reaches $2.84B, 44% of the theft.
Hacken. Original Statement 23 Captured .
Approximately $3 billion has been frozen on-chain to date.
Binance, Binance. Original Statement 469 Captured .
On Friday, the company said it had frozen around $3bn of stolen assets after working with law enforcement, intelligence firms and partners.
Binance, BBC News. Original Statement 10 Captured .
Ripple and World Liberty Financial froze their tokens inside the compromised wallet, which stopped new deposits of those tokens from being taken.
Reviewer note: Statement given an attribution 2026-11-01: it had none.
Hacken. Original Statement 26 Captured .
Binance said it worked with blockchain partners to freeze roughly $3 billion in affected assets.
Binance, npr.org. Original Statement 40 Captured .
Elliptic has verified $2.85 billion of frozen or seized funds, 44% of the theft, almost all of it USDT and USDC. The attacker is swapping the rest into ETH and other assets that cannot be frozen, and moving funds between blockchains, using automated scripts that run around the clock.
Elliptic, Elliptic. Original Statement 57 Captured .
The Arbitrum Security Council took emergency action to move assets out of the attacker's reach, and on October 31 Optimism's governance appears to have done the same, moving 44 million OP (around $5 million) out of the attacker's address.
Elliptic, Elliptic. Original Statement 93 Captured .
Stablecoins make up 94% of the frozen funds, almost entirely on Ethereum and Tron. Arbitrum and Optimism are the only blockchains where everything stolen has been secured, in both cases by the network's own governance. Nothing stolen on Bitcoin, the XRP Ledger, Solana or NEAR has been frozen, because native assets have no issuer that can freeze them.
Elliptic, Elliptic. Original Statement 94 Captured .
Before the freezes landed, the attacker converted around $786 million of stablecoins into ETH and TRX.
Elliptic, Elliptic. Original Statement 95 Captured .
A second attacker wallet deposited 59.9 million USDT into Aave as collateral and borrowed 19,762 ETH, before Aave froze the affected markets. The loan is still open and close to the point of liquidation.
Elliptic, Elliptic. Original Statement 97 Captured .
On Tron, 234 million USDT was swapped for 638 million TRX on SunSwap. On Ethereum, 48 million RLUSD was sold before Ripple froze the remainder, and around 150 other tokens were dumped for ETH on decentralized exchanges.
Elliptic, Elliptic. Original Statement 98 Captured .
Tether and Circle froze about $1.8B in the main collection address within 40 minutes, and with later freezes by other issuers and the Arbitrum Security Council, Binance puts the verified total frozen at about $3B.
blockaid.io. Original Statement 103 Captured .
Binance co-founder Changpeng Zhao said the activity appeared to be a hack, adding that Tether and Circle had frozen approximately $971 million and $823 million, respectively. Zhao said he expected all user funds to be fully covered.
Changpeng Zhao, Cointelegraph. Original Statement 114 Captured .
Circle CEO Jeremy Allaire said the company had frozen more than $800 million in USDC in coordination with law enforcement and would continue supporting the investigation.
Jeremy Allaire, Cointelegraph. Original Statement 115 Captured .
Tether CEO Paolo Ardoino said the company had frozen more than $1.567 billion in USDT linked to the potential exploit.
Paolo Ardoino, Cointelegraph. Original Statement 116 Captured .
Tether, Circle, Ripple and World Liberty Financial froze about USD 2.67 billion in stablecoins, and Arbitrum's Security Council froze 8,426 ETH and 74.6 million ARB on its network, for a total of roughly USD 2.7 billion.
TRM Labs, TRM Labs. Original Statement 138 Captured .
Stablecoin issuers began freezing funds 56 minutes after the first transfer. Tether acted first, at 21:01, about 37 minutes after the big Ethereum transaction, and Circle followed three minutes later. Binance suspended deposits and withdrawals that night and published a written update at 02:23 UTC, a little over six hours after the first transfer.
Hacken. Original Statement 158 Captured .
Stablecoin issuer Tether said it froze nearly $1.57 billion in assets linked to the incident, while Circle froze more than $800 million.
Yahoo Finance. Original Statement 159 Captured .
Elliptic’s Robinson says that around $2.8 billion, or around 44 percent of the total amount stolen, has been frozen by crypto companies and exchanges so far, with almost all of this being stablecoins.
Tom Robinson, WIRED. Original Statement 160 Captured .
We have worked with blockchain partners to freeze affected assets, with ~$3 billion frozen on-chain so far.
Binance, Binance. Original Statement 163 Captured .
Worked with law enforcement, blockchain intelligence firms, asset issuers and industry partners to trace and freeze affected assets. Approximately $3 billion has been frozen on-chain to date.
Binance, Binance. Original Statement 170 Captured .
Chainalysis said approximately $2.8 billion had been frozen so far.
Approximately $2.8 billion has been frozen so far.
Reviewer note: Elsewhere on the same page the as-of time is left as an unfilled placeholder ('[time] ET').
Chainalysis, Chainalysis. Original Statement 192 Captured .
Over nearly 20 minutes it swapped $325 million in stablecoins into $285 million in ETH.
Chainalysis, Chainalysis. Original Statement 194 Captured .
Ripple "promptly" froze roughly $200 million in associated funds, co-CEO Yi He [said]
Reviewer note: TRM, by contrast, confirmed a 40.5 million RLUSD freeze on-chain.
Yi He, The Block. Original Statement 204 Captured .
Binance has said the attack began with a compromised employee laptop and involved multiple breach points. It found no evidence of private-key leakage and said roughly $3bn of affected assets had been frozen.
Reviewer note: Statement reworded 2026-11-01: it gave the Guardian's paraphrase as Binance's own statement and dropped the hedge. Binance's own updates say the incident "may involve" a compromised laptop (statements 280 and 284).
Binance, The Guardian. Original Statement 223 Captured .
Binance co-CEO Yi He said Ripple helped stop about USD 200 million from moving; TRM has confirmed the 40.5 million RLUSD freeze onchain.
Reviewer note: Yi He's figure is Binance's side of a disagreement: TRM confirmed 40.5 million RLUSD frozen on-chain.
Yi He, TRM Labs. Original Statement 243 Captured .
Elliptic said it had verified $2.85 billion of frozen or seized funds, 44% of the theft.
Elliptic has verified $2.85 billion of frozen or seized funds, 44% of the theft
Elliptic, Elliptic. Original Statement 313 Captured .
Tether froze that wallet 37 minutes later, locking 1.18 billion USDT in place
Elliptic, Elliptic. Original Statement 314 Captured .
Hacken said stablecoin issuers began freezing funds 56 minutes after the first transfer.
Stablecoin issuers began freezing funds 56 minutes after the first transfer.
Hacken. Original Statement 318 Captured .
“The remaining $3.3 billion is mostly Bitcoin, Ether, and XRP, which no one can freeze,” Robinson says.
Reviewer note: Elliptic Robinson estimate relayed by WIRED; compare Elliptic 3.25B (claim 101) and 3.33B at 07:00 UTC (claim 395).
Tom Robinson, WIRED. Original Statement 383 Captured .
Tether and Circle used it, locking up about $2.39 billion between them. That’s 43% of the haul. That leaves somewhere between $2.6 and $3.2 billion still out there.
Reviewer note: Statement reworded to "Decrypt reported" and approved 2026-11-01. From Decrypt's Morning Minute, published 2026-10-30 12:31 UTC; the time of the count is not stated. The $1.8 billion on 29 October (claim 694) is the same outlet's earlier count.
Decrypt. Original Statement 663 Captured .
The issuers froze about 2.8 billion dollars, and most of it within 47 minutes of the main sweep, but the attacker had moved 700 million USDT out of the hub before the first freeze landed and converted close to 800 million dollars of stablecoins into assets nobody can freeze.
Halborn. Original Statement 764 Captured .
What the attacker keeps is what nobody can freeze. By Elliptic's count about 3.33 billion dollars sat in roughly 43 addresses: 511,861 ETH, 18,270 BTC, 233 million XRP and 670 million TRX, with about 445 million in XRP, SOL and NEAR that has not moved at all.
Halborn. Original Statement 767 Captured .
| Time | Chain | Token | Target | Transaction |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ethereum | USDT | 0x5227f603c1ee34ce3c06efe6477003bdfccb2f8c | 0x7baba482077843514d9c72bac0110ba0916b0814288a72917e2c3bb27a9d8659 | |
| ethereum | USDC | 0x5227f603c1ee34ce3c06efe6477003bdfccb2f8c | 0xc954c86f118e8e410e6a3eb9e3b38ff4a95fbdae9d2d58e13166afb7a1f4fc5f | |
| ethereum | USDT | 0x28c6c06298d514db089934071355e5743bf21d60 | 0x312e166cb9e602582f426288f755a4b08e1eddb456b7e4bd614adae11080d305 | |
| ethereum | USDC | 0x28c6c06298d514db089934071355e5743bf21d60 | 0xb57c2143508019ac592a9dadb988b39003589f6f54c1924d4163f60520a784f5 | |
| ethereum | USDC | 0xee7ae85f2fe2239e27d9c1e23fffe168d63b4055 | 0xf2faba0e8ab74e84dde0c7ded90effe20a4cedbde1653f0c98220d2f774eeebb | |
| ethereum | USDC | 0x294828705974ad04d86a24a2ff6efe762505a0ed | 0x884b83c4ed4ddb0a33cb4977df7d9aa1b94ac14f8b7218680824955337fadb1c |
Where taken funds are said to have been gathered, and what the attacker is said to hold afterwards.
Between 20:30 and 20:33, before Tether acted, 700 million USDT left the hub in two transfers; Tether later caught 205 million of it one and two hops downstream.
Halborn. Original Statement 765 Captured .
At current prices, the attacker now controls around $3.25 billion of assets that cannot be frozen by an issuer, spread across more than 800 addresses. This includes around 584,000 ETH ($1.32 billion), 18,327 BTC ($1.42 billion) and 233 million XRP.
Elliptic, Elliptic. Original Statement 101 Captured .
It now holds more than 420,000 ETH and 18,270 BTC, about USD 2.4 billion in assets beyond any issuer's reach.
TRM Labs, TRM Labs. Original Statement 152 Captured .
Conversions, swaps, bridges and distribution after the transfers, as described by the analytics firms that traced them.
Timeline row: Cointelegraph reported CertiK traced $500M USDT to one address, with $325M sold to market makers for ETH by 20:59 UTC
CertiK engineer Dickson Wu traced $500 million in USDT that was sent to one address, with $325 million sold to market makers for ETH by 20:59 UTC, less than an hour after the hack began.
Reviewer note: CertiK engineer Dickson Wu via Cointelegraph. 20:59 UTC is the by time in the source. Statement given an attribution to Cointelegraph 2026-11-01: it had none.
Dickson Wu, Cointelegraph. Original Statement 388 Captured .
“Our investigators are observing never-seen-before laundering patterns with the stolen funds from the Binance exploit,” the company said . “Thousands of transactions in a short period suggest that the attackers are using automation to obscure the trail of funds.”
Reviewer note: Event time is the time Cointelegraph stamped its live-blog entry (10:09 am UTC), not a time stated by the speaker.
Chainalysis, Cointelegraph. Original Statement 130 Captured .
Timeline row: Elliptic said the attacker began moving funds between blockchains, selling stolen AVAX for USDC from 11:38
On October 30, the attacker began moving funds between blockchains. Between 11:38 and 12:29 UTC, they sold all of the stolen AVAX for USDC, bridged it to Ethereum using Circle's Cross-Chain Transfer Protocol (CCTP), and swapped it for 7,242.8 ETH.
Elliptic, Elliptic. Original Statement 100 Captured .
Timeline row: Elliptic said about $196M had been sent out of the main Tron distribution wallet to around 200 wallets
October 31, 22:41 UTC. About $196 million has been sent out of the main Tron distribution wallet to around 200 wallets,
Elliptic, Elliptic. Original Statement 199 Captured .
On Ethereum, 434 million USDT was swapped for 160,451 ETH through Uniswap, 1inch and market makers' request-for-quote systems. The swaps implied a loss of 12% to 26% against the market price, suggesting the attacker was prioritizing speed over value.
Elliptic, Elliptic. Original Statement 96 Captured .
The 18,270 BTC has been split through a short peel chain into 19 addresses, most holding 1,000 BTC each. None of it has yet been sent to a service.
Elliptic, Elliptic. Original Statement 99 Captured .
Many addresses follow a consistent pattern: they receive exactly 1 TRX, then receive additional funds, then forward funds to other addresses.
Chainalysis, Chainalysis. Original Statement 195 Captured .
The main Tron distribution wallet has sent funds every hour for 31 hours straight. The longest pause was 46 minutes, and there was no overnight break.
Elliptic, Elliptic. Original Statement 196 Captured .
Swaps into THORChain use the same amounts again and again, with one value appearing 19 times.
Elliptic, Elliptic. Original Statement 197 Captured .
This repeated sequence suggests a programmatic process for moving and redistributing the stolen funds.
Chainalysis, Chainalysis. Original Statement 296 Captured .
Whether the automation involves AI agents, rather than conventional scripts, cannot be determined from the on-chain data.
Elliptic, Elliptic. Original Statement 304 Captured .
The pattern of transactions suggests that much of the laundering was carried out by software rather than by hand.
Elliptic, Elliptic. Original Statement 305 Captured .
“USDT is real money backed by dollars, and the position is criminal but overcollateralized in the eyes of the protocol.”
Reviewer note: Marc Zeller of Aave Chan Initiative, quoting his X post as relayed by Cointelegraph.
Marc Zeller, Cointelegraph. Original Statement 394 Captured .
The attackers initially stole 200,630 ETH and accumulated the rest by swapping stolen stablecoins and other tokens, Bitquery added.
Reviewer note: Bitquery, relayed by Cointelegraph. Compare Blockaid sweep of 167,464 ETH (claim 107).
Bitquery, Cointelegraph. Original Statement 497 Captured .
The firm has also been tracking funds stolen in Binance’s separate multibillion-dollar hack, saying the attackers are using automation to obscure the trail and leveraging DeFi protocols on Tron to dodge stablecoin freezes.
Reviewer note: Chainalysis statement relayed by The Block; the Tron DeFi detail is not in the earlier Chainalysis claims.
Chainalysis, The Block. Original Statement 524 Captured .
Two lists. The first is the open questions on the open questions page that concern the attack. The second is approved statements in which a source itself says something is unpublished, unknown or unexplained. Neither list is a finding that the answer does not exist.
Pairs of approved statements that do not fit together, flagged by a reviewer. They are grouped by words in the reviewer's note (a time or a zone, a mechanism word, or neither). The site does not decide which is right. A conflict can come from a different method, a different clock, a later correction or an error on either side.
21:01 | Tether freezes 971.1M USDT, 37 minutes after the Ethereum transaction.
Hacken. Captured . Original
Stablecoin issuers began freezing funds by 5:14 p.m. ET on October 29
Chainalysis. Captured . Original
At around 2026-10-29 20:05 (UTC), our hot wallets were compromised, resulting in a loss of approximately $6.3B USD worth of token assets.
Binance. Captured . Original
Around 4:20 p.m. ET on October 29, 2026, funds began leaving Binance hot wallets across multiple blockchains.
Chainalysis. Captured . Original
21:01 | Tether freezes 971.1M USDT, 37 minutes after the Ethereum transaction.
Hacken. Captured . Original
The stolen USDT reached the attacker's main Ethereum wallet at 20:24 UTC. Tether froze that wallet 37 minutes later, locking 1.18 billion USDT in place, and then followed the funds, freezing four more attacker addresses within 17 minutes. Circle froze the 823 million USDC in the same wallet three minutes after that.
Elliptic. Captured . Original
Binance's initial investigation suggests that the security incident may involve a compromised DevOps engineer’s laptop, which allowed an attacker to gain access to a service container and submit unauthorized withdrawal transactions.
Binance. Captured . Original
Our initial investigation suggested that the incident may involve a compromised laptop, however, our subsequent investigation has uncovered additional points of breach.
Binance. Captured . Original
At around 2026-10-29 20:05 (UTC), our hot wallets were compromised, resulting in a loss of approximately $6.3B USD worth of token assets.
Binance. Captured . Original
On October 29, 2026, $6.43 billion in cryptoassets were stolen from Binance, the world's largest cryptoasset exchange, according to Elliptic's analysis.
Elliptic. Captured . Original
Unauthorized transfers totaled approximately $6.4 billion, the largest theft in crypto history.
Chainalysis. Captured . Original
its current estimate of the amount stolen from Binance is $5.912 billion at the time of theft, four times the amount stolen from crypto exchange Bybit in 2025.
Cointelegraph. Captured . Original
Approximately $3 billion has been frozen on-chain to date.
Binance. Captured . Original
Elliptic has verified $2.85 billion of frozen or seized funds, 44% of the theft
Elliptic. Captured . Original
the company had frozen more than $1.567 billion in USDT linked to the potential exploit.
Cointelegraph. Captured . Original
Tether froze that wallet 37 minutes later, locking 1.18 billion USDT in place
Elliptic. Captured . Original
On the evening of 29 October 2026, an attacker emptied Binance hot wallets on 10 blockchains
Hacken. Captured . Original
Over the course of a few hours, the attacker drained Binance hot wallets across 11 blockchains.
Elliptic. Captured . Original
Theories on the theories page whose evidence includes a claim about how the attack worked. Each is speculation, attributed, with the quoted evidence for and against kept apart.
After Binance co-CEO Richard Teng said the attacker used an EIP-7702 delegation, some commenters treated the Ethereum feature as the cause. Ethereum community member VEER said it gave attackers a handy sweep button on Ethereum.
Assessment on the theory page: EIP-7702 was used on Ethereum for the largest single transaction, about $2.53B according to Elliptic and Hacken. TRM Labs says Binance wallets on the other nine chains sent funds through ordinary signed transfers. Two security executives told Cointelegraph the theft could have been done without EIP-7702. Hacken and Blockaid's CEO describe a compromised signing path; in the sources captured as of 2026-11-01, Binance has not published a root cause.
Hacken. Original Statement 317 Captured .At Binance the delegation stayed for 3 hours 46 minutes after the sweep and later deposits were swept again
Note: The delegation stayed in place for 3 hours 46 minutes.
Hacken. Original Statement 326 Captured .The most likely explanation is that the attacker gained the ability to make Binance's hot wallet signing system sign transactions of its choosing across chains.
Note: Signing system signed across chains.
blockaid.io. Original Statement 327 Captured .The delegation itself was visible onchain for three minutes and 24 seconds before the sweep
Note: Delegation visible before the sweep.
blockaid.io. Original Statement 329 Captured .Blockaid's transaction security engine classified the type-4 transaction that delegated Binance 14 as malicious on sight, with the reason that an EOA was being upgraded through EIP-7702 to an untrusted address.
Note: Blockaid says its engine flagged the delegation.
TRM Labs, TRM Labs. Original Statement 458 Captured .Binance wallets on the other nine chains sent funds to the attacker through ordinary signed transfers.
Note: Other chains used ordinary signed transfers.
Richard Teng, Cointelegraph. Original Statement 134 Captured .The attacker used an EIP-7702 delegation to gain execution authority over a hot wallet, Teng said. That delegation “did not pass through our normal approval controls.”
Note: Teng: the delegation did not pass through normal approval controls.
Ido Ben-Natan, Cointelegraph. Original Statement 352 Captured .Attackers could have stolen the funds without EIP-7702, Ido Ben-Natan, Blockaid’s co-founder and CEO, told Cointelegraph on Friday.
Note: Attackers could have stolen the funds without EIP-7702.
Ido Ben-Natan, Cointelegraph. Original Statement 353 Captured .“The 7702 upgrade is a way to do this in one sweep and maybe a way to bypass some sort of checks they may have,”
Note: Blockaid's CEO: 7702 is a way to do it in one sweep.
Cointelegraph. Original Statement 354 Captured .VEER later said the Binance attack appeared broader than a single malicious signature, but that EIP-7702 gave attackers “a handy sweep button on Ethereum.”
Note: A handy sweep button on Ethereum.
Ivo Georgiev, Cointelegraph. Original Statement 355 Captured .Ivo Georgiev, co-founder and CEO of Ethereum wallet provider Ambire, said that EIP-7702 made little difference to the attack because the hackers already had the ability to authorize transactions.
Note: EIP-7702 made little difference.
Some firms and commenters raised doubts about attributing the theft to North Korea's TraderTraitor group. Before the FBI statement, Hacken listed reasons for caution, including a small overlap with funds from the Bitget theft and a slower pace of conversion than it said North Korean groups usually show. On Hacker News, two commenters suggested North Korea was a convenient or politically attractive target to blame.
Assessment on the theory page: On 31 October the FBI said North Korea was responsible and named TraderTraitor. TRM Labs, Chainalysis and Elliptic reached the same view earlier. They cite the on-chain link to Bitget funds, the preparation, and methods similar to the Bybit theft. Hacken's reasons for caution were written before the FBI statement. The FBI statement we captured does not set out its evidence. In the sources captured as of 2026-11-01, the two Hacker News comments give no evidence for another actor. In the sources captured as of 2026-11-01, Binance has not published its root cause. Hacken wrote that "that firm", the Elliptic analysis it links, calls this "the most diagnostic fact still missing". As of 2026-11-01 the weight of captured public attribution points to North Korea, with technical questions still open.
BBC News. Original Statement 338 Captured .they had robust intelligence pointing to North Korean state-backed hacking unit the Lazarus Group, also known as TraderTraitor
Note: BBC says TraderTraitor is also known as Lazarus.
Hacken. Original Statement 319 Captured .The overlap with Bitget is small, about $39,000 of Binance funds at the shared address against about $510,000 from Bitget
Note: Hacken: overlap with Bitget funds is small.
Hacken. Original Statement 320 Captured .The thief also left most of the stolen USDT unconverted for 37 minutes on Ethereum and 46 on Tron, where North Korean groups usually move faster.
Note: Hacken: slower conversion than usual for North Korean groups.
Hacken. Original Statement 911 Captured .None of this is proof, and the most careful reading explains why. The overlap with Bitget is small, about $39,000 of Binance funds at the shared address against about $510,000 from Bitget, and that shows a shared laundering network, not necessarily the same hackers. The thief also left most of the stolen USDT unconverted for 37 minutes on Ethereum and 46 on Tron, where North Korean groups usually move faster. The laundering through market makers and lending protocols doesn't match the older pattern either, and the root cause is still unpublished, which that firm calls "the most diagnostic fact still missing."
Note: Hacken: root cause still unpublished. Hacken's text gives "the most diagnostic fact still missing" to the Elliptic analysis it links.
Hacken. Original Statement 912 Captured .Finally, no government has confirmed anything, whereas after the Bybit theft the FBI named North Korea within five days .
Note: Written before the FBI statement.
Elliptic, Elliptic. Original Statement 306 Captured .Very few actors could coordinate an attack across 11 blockchains in around three hours.
Note: Elliptic: few actors could coordinate this.
Elliptic, Elliptic. Original Statement 307 Captured .This closely resembles the Bybit theft, in which North Korean hackers compromised a developer's machine at the wallet provider Safe{Wallet} and manipulated the transaction that Bybit's signers approved.
Note: Elliptic: resembles Bybit.
Elliptic, Elliptic. Original Statement 310 Captured .The two sets of funds have now been combined in several wallets, and the amount has grown overnight. The link was first reported by ZachXBT.
Note: Elliptic: Binance and Bitget funds combined in several wallets.
WIRED. Original Statement 333 Captured .Neither Binance nor law enforcement officials have named any suspected links between the attack and North Korean hackers.
Note: WIRED, before the FBI statement.
The Guardian. Original Statement 402 Captured .TraderTraitor emerged from Lazarus, a group working from North Korea’s Reconnaissance General Bureau, a military intelligence agency.
Note: The Guardian says TraderTraitor emerged from Lazarus.
TRM Labs, TRM Labs. Original Statement 302 Captured .North Korea’s elite hacking unit, based on robust on and off-chain intelligence. We make this judgment with high confidence.
Note: TRM attributes to TraderTraitor with high confidence.
ZachXBT, Cointelegraph. Original Statement 347 Captured .“This indicates the same actor is likely behind both incidents,” he said.
Note: ZachXBT says the same actor is likely behind both.
Chainalysis, Chainalysis. Original Statement 297 Captured .The strongest evidence emerged when Chainalysis investigators observed, in real time, funds stolen from Binance commingling with funds stolen in last month’s Bitget exploit, which had been attributed to North Korean actors.
Note: Chainalysis: funds commingled with Bitget funds.
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), FBI. Original Statement 295 Captured .The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is releasing information advising the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) was responsible for the theft of more than $6 billion USD in virtual assets from cryptocurrency exchange Binance, on or about October 29, 2026.
Note: FBI says North Korea was responsible.
Hacker News. Original Statement 423 Captured .I think NK is a convenient target to blame, instead of highlighting that random events from random insiders across different financial operations are the actual cause.
Note: Commenter says North Korea is a convenient target.
Hacker News. Original Statement 429 Captured .Yet, picking politically attractive proxy-scapegoats is a classic pro move.
Note: Commenter says scapegoats are a classic move.
Reports of automated laundering led to questions about AI agents. Chainalysis said the attackers appear to use automation. A separate Chainalysis breach was described by The Block as the work of an AI-assisted hacker. Elliptic said whether the automation involves AI agents cannot be determined from on-chain data.
Assessment on the theory page: The captured sources say the laundering looks automated. None of the sources captured as of 2026-11-01 shows AI agents were used against Binance. Elliptic says the on-chain data cannot settle it. Chainalysis said its own breach is not related to the Binance theft. We found no source in the sources captured as of 2026-11-01 that reports evidence of AI agents in the Binance attack itself.
Elliptic, Elliptic. Original Statement 304 Captured .Whether the automation involves AI agents, rather than conventional scripts, cannot be determined from the on-chain data.
Note: Elliptic cannot determine this from on-chain data.
Elliptic, Elliptic. Original Statement 305 Captured .The pattern of transactions suggests that much of the laundering was carried out by software rather than by hand.
Note: Elliptic: software rather than hand.
The Block. Original Statement 459 Captured .Blockchain analytics firm Chainalysis said an AI-assisted hacker breached its systems and accessed “non-sensitive” customer data, including names and emails.
Note: A separate Chainalysis breach.
Chainalysis, The Block. Original Statement 460 Captured .Chainalysis said the incident is "not related to the recent crypto theft at Binance."
Note: Chainalysis says its breach is unrelated to the Binance theft.
Chainalysis, Chainalysis. Original Statement 296 Captured .This repeated sequence suggests a programmatic process for moving and redistributing the stolen funds.
Note: Chainalysis: programmatic process.
TRM Labs and WIRED report that most of the money left in about 20 minutes. Kok Tin Gan of NyxLab told NPR the event raises questions about why stronger approval controls were not in place. Binance co-CEO Richard Teng said the attacker's delegation did not pass through normal approval controls.
Assessment on the theory page: Sources agree the main drain took about 20 minutes, with one Ethereum transaction of about $2.53B at 20:24 UTC. Blockaid says it flagged the drain under two minutes after the sweep and that the delegation was visible on-chain for 3 minutes 24 seconds before it. Hacken says the delegation stayed in place for 3 hours 46 minutes and that nobody outside Binance knows whether a policy layer was set. In the sources captured as of 2026-11-01, Binance has not said when it first detected the transfers or what limits its signing system applied. The attacker destroyed tooling and traces, Teng said, which complicates the investigation. The post-mortem Binance promised should answer these points.
Hacken. Original Statement 315 Captured .Most of the money left in about 20 minutes, and a smaller second wave hit Avalanche and Polygon around 23:05 UTC.
Note: Hacken agrees on about 20 minutes.
Hacken. Original Statement 316 Captured .Nobody outside Binance knows whether a policy layer was set, what it checked, or how an attacker managed to get signatures out of it.
Note: Policy layer unknown. (in the sources captured as of 2026-11-01)
Hacken. Original Statement 317 Captured .At Binance the delegation stayed for 3 hours 46 minutes after the sweep and later deposits were swept again
Note: Delegation stayed 3 hours 46 minutes.
Hacken. Original Statement 318 Captured .Stablecoin issuers began freezing funds 56 minutes after the first transfer.
Note: First freezes 56 minutes after the first transfer.
Hacken. Original Statement 324 Captured .Cap value and rate per wallet at the signer and hold new destinations for a second approval
Note: Hacken's suggested limits.
Kok Tin Gan, npr.org. Original Statement 331 Captured .The event, meanwhile, also raises questions about why stronger approval controls were not in place, said Kok Tin Gan, cofounder and CEO of cybersecurity firm NyxLab.
Note: Questions about approval controls.
blockaid.io. Original Statement 327 Captured .The delegation itself was visible onchain for three minutes and 24 seconds before the sweep
Note: Delegation visible for 3 minutes 24 seconds before the sweep.
blockaid.io. Original Statement 328 Captured .Blockaid’s detection flagged the drain under two minutes after the sweep and before any public report
Note: An outside firm flagged it within two minutes.
WIRED. Original Statement 332 Captured .The majority of the stolen crypto was taken in a period of around 20 minutes on October 29, according to analysis by crypto tracing firm TRM Labs.
Note: Most funds taken in about 20 minutes.
Richard Teng, Cointelegraph. Original Statement 134 Captured .The attacker used an EIP-7702 delegation to gain execution authority over a hot wallet, Teng said. That delegation “did not pass through our normal approval controls.”
Note: Delegation did not pass through normal approval controls.
Richard Teng, Cointelegraph. Original Statement 340 Captured .Teng also disclosed that the attacker used a “self-destruct mechanism” to destroy tools and traces during the breach, complicating the investigation.
Note: Teng says the attacker destroyed tooling and traces.
Spreek, Cointelegraph. Original Statement 411 Captured .Concerns were first raised by blockchain researcher Spreek, who
Note: An on-chain researcher raised the first alert.
Early indicators on the Ethereum activity suggested the attacker had phished the authorizations, according to TRM Labs and Hacken.
Assessment on the theory page: Both firms said this would explain Ethereum but none of the other chains. TRM Labs says wallets on the other nine chains sent funds through ordinary signed transfers. Blockaid's CEO and later analyses point to a compromise of the signing system, not a leaked key. Binance says it found no evidence of a private key leak. No source in the sources captured as of 2026-11-01 now defends the phishing explanation.
Hacken. Original Statement 323 Captured .Binance says it found no evidence that a private key leaked, while investigators say Binance's signing system signed for the attacker, and the two statements can both be true.
Note: No key leak and a compromised signing system can both be true.
Hacken. Original Statement 325 Captured .Early signs on Ethereum pointed to phishing of the authorizations, which could explain Ethereum but none of the other chains.
Note: Hacken: early signs pointed to phishing.
Hacken. Original Statement 326 Captured .The most likely explanation is that the attacker gained the ability to make Binance's hot wallet signing system sign transactions of its choosing across chains.
Note: Most likely the signing system signed.
blockaid.io. Original Statement 89 Captured .Eleven Binance hot-wallet keys signed transfers to an address created minutes earlier, and one of them signed an EIP-7702 authorization that turned its wallet into standing infrastructure for the attacker.
Note: Eleven hot-wallet keys signed transfers.
TRM Labs, TRM Labs. Original Statement 303 Captured .Early indicators on the Ethereum activity suggested the attacker had phished the authorizations. That explanation covers Ethereum and leaves the other chains unexplained.
Note: TRM: early indicators suggested phishing.
TRM Labs, TRM Labs. Original Statement 458 Captured .Binance wallets on the other nine chains sent funds to the attacker through ordinary signed transfers.
Note: Other chains used ordinary signed transfers.
Ido Ben-Natan, Cointelegraph. Original Statement 475 Captured .a compromise of signing infrastructure. We don’t think a key was leaked,” he said.
Note: Blockaid's CEO: signing infrastructure compromised, key not leaked.
Commenters and analysts asked whether a vendor or supply chain compromise was involved. Binance said it found additional points of breach beyond an engineer's laptop. Elliptic said the theft resembles Bybit, where a developer's machine at the wallet provider Safe{Wallet} was compromised.
Assessment on the theory page: In the sources captured as of 2026-11-01, Binance has not said whether any third-party vendor was involved. Its updates describe an engineer's laptop and additional points of breach without detail. The Polymarket compromise earlier on 29 October involved a third-party provider, but the Guardian called it an unrelated incident. Chainalysis said its own breach is not related to the Binance theft. We found no source in the sources captured as of 2026-11-01 that links a vendor compromise to Binance. The promised post-mortem may settle this.
Hacken. Original Statement 316 Captured .Nobody outside Binance knows whether a policy layer was set, what it checked, or how an attacker managed to get signatures out of it.
Note: Signing-system design not public. (in the sources captured as of 2026-11-01)
Elliptic, Elliptic. Original Statement 307 Captured .This closely resembles the Bybit theft, in which North Korean hackers compromised a developer's machine at the wallet provider Safe{Wallet} and manipulated the transaction that Bybit's signers approved.
Note: Bybit loss involved a compromised developer machine at Safe{Wallet}.
Chainalysis, The Block. Original Statement 460 Captured .Chainalysis said the incident is "not related to the recent crypto theft at Binance."
Note: Chainalysis says its own breach is unrelated.
Binance, Binance. Original Statement 284 Captured .Our initial investigation suggested that the incident may involve a compromised laptop, however, our subsequent investigation has uncovered additional points of breach.
Note: Binance found additional points of breach.
The Guardian. Original Statement 913 Captured .In an unrelated incident earlier on Thursday, the prediction market operator Polymarket temporarily halted trading after a security incident involving a third-party provider.
Note: The Guardian calls the Polymarket halt unrelated.
Hacker News. Original Statement 426 Captured .I don't think those people have the skills needed to elevate their initial access to a full binance compromise within a few hours.
Note: Replies that the other attack's actors lacked the skills to reach Binance in hours.
The theft came days before a US election and while the Clarity Act was stalled in the Senate. A separate Polymarket compromise happened the same day. Politicians used the hack in arguments about crypto legislation.
Assessment on the theory page: The sources captured as of 2026-11-01 show coincidences of date. They do not show a link. TRM Labs says preparation began at least 36 hours before the theft. Nothing in the sources captured as of 2026-11-01 shows the attacker chose the date for political or market reasons, and no source says so. The politicians quoted were using the event in debate. They were not claiming to know who chose the timing. Bitcoin was about 4% below its pre-attack price two days later, and Cointelegraph also cited a tech-stock sell-off.
TRM Labs, TRM Labs. Original Statement 301 Captured .Preparation began at least 36 hours before the theft. The attacker's operator wallet received three small withdrawals from Tornado Cash, a service that obscures where crypto comes from, starting the morning of October 28.
Note: Preparation began at least 36 hours earlier.
Cointelegraph. Original Statement 366 Captured .Bitcoin traded near $77,400 at 4:00 pm on Saturday, about 4% below its price shortly before the attack began Thursday
Note: Bitcoin about 4% below its pre-attack price.
Cointelegraph. Original Statement 370 Captured .The Clarity Act would have given crypto firms legal cover to freeze suspicious transactions the instant law enforcement calls.
Note: Senator Lummis cites the stalled Clarity Act.
Michael Selig, Cointelegraph. Original Statement 371 Captured .“This proves our exact point in proposing regulations for crypto markets.
Note: CFTC Chair Selig says the hack proves the CFTC's point.
Cointelegraph. Original Statement 372 Captured .It was not clear whether there was any immediate political advantage to be gained from the hack, which was widely attributed to a North Korean group, but Republican and Democratic sides began staking out positions almost immediately.
Note: Cointelegraph: unclear whether anyone gains.
Cointelegraph. Original Statement 373 Captured .Soon after the $6.3 billion hack of Binance, the biggest in crypto history, some political and administration figures began offering their opinions with a US election approaching on Nov. 3 and voting already having begun in many locations.
Note: US election on 3 November.
Cointelegraph. Original Statement 369 Captured .Shares of publicly traded cryptocurrency companies fell sharply Friday, with Coinbase dropping more than 13% a day after reporting a decline in third-quarter revenue
Note: Coinbase fell a day after reporting lower revenue.
Cointelegraph. Original Statement 368 Captured .The effects of the hack on crypto markets were compounded by tech-stock losses that came with Q4 earnings projections.
Note: Tech-stock losses compounded the move.
The Guardian. Original Statement 913 Captured .In an unrelated incident earlier on Thursday, the prediction market operator Polymarket temporarily halted trading after a security incident involving a third-party provider.
Note: The Guardian calls the Polymarket halt unrelated.
Hacker News. Original Statement 426 Captured .I don't think those people have the skills needed to elevate their initial access to a full binance compromise within a few hours.
Note: Commenter doubts that actor could reach Binance in hours.
No source captured as of 2026-11-01 reports evidence that an insider was involved, and no investigator or official in those sources has said so. Some Hacker News commenters asked whether the theft was an inside job, and one wrote that it was almost certainly an inside job given the knowledge of Binance systems the attack needed. This is speculation by commenters.
Assessment on the theory page: Commenters point to the knowledge of Binance systems the attack needed. Binance's co-CEO said the investigation has not attributed responsibility to any individual. The FBI says North Korea's TraderTraitor group is responsible. We found no source, in the sources captured as of 2026-11-01, that reports evidence of knowing insider involvement. In the sources captured as of 2026-11-01, Binance has not yet published its post-mortem, so how the attacker obtained the signatures is not public. We do not identify or comment on any individual.
Hacken. Original Statement 316 Captured .Nobody outside Binance knows whether a policy layer was set, what it checked, or how an attacker managed to get signatures out of it.
Note: How signatures were obtained is not public. (in the sources captured as of 2026-11-01)
Elliptic, Elliptic. Original Statement 308 Captured .Teng added that the attack "was not carried out by one person"
Note: Teng said the attack was not carried out by one person.
TRM Labs, TRM Labs. Original Statement 301 Captured .Preparation began at least 36 hours before the theft. The attacker's operator wallet received three small withdrawals from Tornado Cash, a service that obscures where crypto comes from, starting the morning of October 28.
Note: Preparation traced on-chain, including test runs.
Richard Teng, Cointelegraph. Original Statement 346 Captured .“Our investigation has not attributed responsibility to any individual,” he wrote.
Note: Binance has not attributed responsibility to any individual. (in the sources captured as of 2026-11-01)
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), FBI. Original Statement 295 Captured .The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is releasing information advising the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) was responsible for the theft of more than $6 billion USD in virtual assets from cryptocurrency exchange Binance, on or about October 29, 2026.
Note: The FBI attributes the theft to North Korea.
Hacker News. Original Statement 375 Captured .And almost certainly an inside job given the knowledge of Binance systems required.
Note: Commenter's view, no evidence given. (in the sources captured as of 2026-11-01)
Hacker News. Original Statement 473 Captured .You split it into thousands and then use hardware security modules with a risk management system so it doesn't let you transfer $5bn instantly. Unless it was an inside job maybe? I'd be really curious to know what their security architecture was.
Note: Asks about an inside job after noting the size of the transfers.
Hacker News. Original Statement 424 Captured .Was there actually a hack into binance systems, or was it just some insider or credential leak?
Note: A question, not an assertion.
Statements dated before this incident in which a source describes how an earlier incident worked. They are listed for comparison with the descriptions above. A resemblance is the source's own observation and is not evidence about this incident. Their attribution statements are on the attribution page.
TraderTraitor activity is often characterized by targeted social engineering directed at multiple employees of the same company simultaneously.
In late March 2024, a North Korean cyber actor, masquerading as a recruiter on LinkedIn, contacted an employee at Ginco, a Japan-based enterprise cryptocurrency wallet software company.
After mid-May 2024, TraderTraitor actors exploited session cookie information to impersonate the compromised employee
In late-May 2024, the actors likely used this access to manipulate a legitimate transaction request by a DMM employee, resulting in the loss of 4,502.9 BTC, worth $308 million at the time of the attack.
The root of the Bybit transaction was a malicious transaction designed to modify the smart contract logic of the exchange’s multi-signature wallet.
This attack highlights a common playbook used by the DPRK: orchestrating social engineering attacks and employing intricate laundering methods in an attempt to move stolen funds undetected.
FBI refers to this specific North Korean malicious cyber activity as "TraderTraitor
Statements recorded with status theory about how the attack worked. They are opinions from named or anonymous commenters, not evidence.
Kok Tin Gan, npr.org. Original Statement 53 Captured ."This looks like one signature that gave the attacker a never-expiring, full-access token to a Binance hot wallet," he said, referring to cryptocurrency wallets that hold users' "private keys," or unique authorizations, digitally and which are connected to the internet.
Hacker News. Original Statement 375 Captured .And almost certainly an inside job given the knowledge of Binance systems required.
Hacker News. Original Statement 422 Captured .My money is on an inside job.
Hacker News. Original Statement 424 Captured .Was there actually a hack into binance systems, or was it just some insider or credential leak?
Hacker News. Original Statement 425 Captured .Something tells me that the timing of the Claude Code supply chain attack is not a coincidence
Hacker News. Original Statement 426 Captured .I don't think those people have the skills needed to elevate their initial access to a full binance compromise within a few hours.
Hacker News. Original Statement 473 Captured .You split it into thousands and then use hardware security modules with a risk management system so it doesn't let you transfer $5bn instantly. Unless it was an inside job maybe? I'd be really curious to know what their security architecture was.